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Precarity of place: a complement to the growing precariat literature
Susan Banki*
This article suggests that our current understandings of precarity are insufficient to
describe the specific challenges of noncitizen living. It offers a counter concept that is
5related, but distinct from precarity: ‘precarity of place’. The term, far from being
focused on the way precarity manifests itself in the workplace, instead focuses on
the challenges of physical residence for migrants and the tightrope-like nature of
migrant life. The article draws several parallels between the growing literature on
what I call ‘labour precarity’ and ‘precarity of place’, including its origins in coloni-
10alism and neoliberalism, its nebulous class quality, and social movement responses.
Drawing on examples from Burmese migrant populations in Thailand, the article posits
that ‘precarity of place’ be considered in conjunction with, but separated from, our
current understandings of (labour) precarity.
Introduction
15The growing precarity
AQ1
literature offers some valuable
AQ2
ways of thinking about both the
roots of and responses to precarity, whether defined existentially, economically, or inter-
subjectively. As the terms ‘precariat’, ‘precarious’, and ‘precarity’ grow ever more
popular in the academic literature, it should also be noted that the term, in its eagerness
to encompass all those who experience precarity, fails to properly capture the challenges
20of one of its subset populations: that of noncitizens.
Rather than discard the term altogether, this article incorporates elements from the
precariat literature and offers a counter (sub)concept: ‘precarity of place’. The article
reviews the precarity literature and then argues for the importance of a separate term for
‘precarity of place’, as differentiated from labour precarity, noting how the concepts are
25uneasily aligned, that is, they complement each other but offer clearly distinct experiences
to their victims. The article turns to an example from the Global South to illuminate
similarities and differences between the two concepts, drawing on Burmese migrant
populations in Thailand, and concludes with suggestions for future research, both theore-
tical and empirical.
30Precarity and the precariat
The notion of precarity describes the condition of being vulnerable to exploitation because
of a lack of security. Precarity suggests the potential for exploitation and abuse, but not its
certain presence. Thus precarious work is not the fact of consistent unemployment, but the
looming threat, and perhaps frequent fact, of it. Precarity of residence does not suggest
35imminent deportation from a country, but its very real possibility. Similarly, social
precarity does not describe an absence of supportive networks, but the potential for
their dismantling. The literature has made frequent reference to the fact that precarity of
one kind may aggravate other precarities. For example, precarious legal status affects the
ability to secure stable work. Social networks are weakened when people are uprooted.
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40And an unstable work environment can stem the ability to develop relationships, as those
in precarious situations lack the social infrastructure to create networks and lack the
confidence and financial resources that much socialising requires (Goldring and Landolt
2011).
The intellectual founders and forerunners of precarity comprise Bourdieu, who articu-
45lated the term in 1998, Foucault, Habermas, Hardt and Negri, and Arendt (Standing 2011,
2). It has further been explored by Butler, whose treatment of the notion delves into our
understandings of self-sovereignty (and its lack) and suggests a communal approach to
nonviolence that encourages a repositioning of not only our ethnic and racial frames, but
our human ones (relative to nonhumans) (2006). This philosophical positioning of the
50term sowed the seeds for an empirically grounded concept, of which precariat is the result.
The precariat, referred to by Standing as ‘globalisation’s child’ (2011, 5), is not
necessarily part of the ‘working class’ or the ‘proletariat’ but instead consists of social
‘classes’ on either side of the proletariat – both highly educated and motivated creative
workers struggling to find secure employment, on the one hand, and a lumpen proletariat-
55minus-stability, on the other hand. Each ‘type’ of precariat class member faces different
challenges, although the first certainly has more freedom and flexibility than the second.
Precarious work, which since the 1970s has become nearly a universal phenomenon,
is defined by Branch and Hanley as employment that is ‘uncertain, unpredictable, and
risky from the point of view of the worker’ (2011, 569). They argue that the nature of
60such work is felt particularly acutely by low-skill and low-wage workers (2011). Fantone
reminds us that precariousness is an inherent feature of capitalism and although it is more
pronounced in western, post-Fordist capitalist cities recently transformed by globalisation
and information technologies, in colonial cities hyperexploitation of labour, particularly
women’s domestic labour, has always been the norm (2007, 10).
65Despite the lengthy history of the precarious nature of capitalism, the precariat
movement only relatively recently found its wings in the stirrings of the Milan May
Day 2001 protest and subsequent EuroMayday protests starting in 2005, which challenged
the tenets of globalisation through creative and symbolic repertoires of contention. The
movement demands universal rights for workers (Doerr 2010, 4), free migration policies,
70and a universal basic income (Dean 2012, 356) (also known as a ‘citizenship income’, ‘a
form of welfare [allowing workers] to choose which professional path to pursue and what
to produce’ (Galetto et al. 2007, 111), which would ensure the ‘right to decent work’
enshrined, in Dean’s interpretation, in Article 23[1] of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (2012, 357)).
75Most commonly the precarity literature refers to insecurity in the workplace, and
Standing’s oft-cited work on the precariat details seven forms of labour security that are
absent in the condition of precarity (2011, 10). Yet the notion of precarity has theoretical
traction elsewhere, as the examples above and the literature below indicate, and other
works have expanded the understanding of the term to include a lack of security in other
80areas of how we manage day to day, such as debt and indebtedness (Ross 2008), access to
legal documentation (Goldring and Landolt 2011), gender norms (Brah 2002;
Abrahamson 2004; Fantone 2007), and ‘other aspects of intersubjective life, including
housing, debt, and the ability to build affective social relations’ (Neilson and Rossiter
2005, n.p.).
85Critiques and variations of the use of precarity as a term have emerged along with its
increasing popularity. These include charges of US-centrism (Lee and Kofman 2012),
which this article tries to correct by a focus on the Global South. There has also been
considerable debate on the ‘newness’ of precarity as a condition of work or a structural
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feature of a social class (Mitropoulos 2005). As part of the history of capitalism, many
90people around the world have, after all, been subject to unreliable, unprotected and poorly
paid work conditions for centuries; the contemporary ‘naming’ of the precariat arguably
comes about through the cultural capital of the middle classes enabling them to name their
conditions as their standards of living decompose and they become exposed to the risks
that are routine for so many other workers.
95Indeed, as precarity has increasingly encompassed a greater number of actors – the
poor, the rich, the creative, the human, the animal, the worker, the temporary worker, the
nonworker, the migrant, and the refugee – there is real concern that its essence has been
diluted. Yet there are populations for which the underlying concept of precarity is useful,
because it describes both the roots of precarity in global systems and its outcomes in
100creating differentiated types of sufferers. Specifically, this article argues, there is value to
capturing a subset of the precariat: that of non-citizens, who experience ‘precarity of
place’.
Precarity of place
The precarity of noncitizens is particular, and at the same time, it aligns closely with
105broader concepts in the precariat literature. Yet ‘precarity of place’ deserves its own
analysis because, as the extensive migration literature notes, our current global system
is organised around units of nation states, and it is primarily from these units, and national
governments, that our rights accrue. Arendt famously related those with no state to those
with no rights ([1951]1979). While the introduction of an international human rights
110regime makes individuals subjects of humanity and not nationality, in practice, it is
sovereign governments that protect (or fail to protect) these rights. Even without using
rights language, we can argue that membership in a group proffers benefits, and that in our
current international system, the body that controls the distribution of the vast portion of
benefits that can render our lives better (and less precarious) is the state.
115Denizenship, just short of citizenship, suggests that the state can offer a suite of rights,
in effect, picking and choosing the rights they want to protect and the services they want
to offer (see, e.g., Hammar 1990). Even post-national membership positions the state as
the actor that distributes rights and benefits, though in this scheme, not on the basis of
nationality but according to other categories – rights of residents, workers, and so on
120(Tambini 2001; Standing 2011, chapter 4; Soysal 2012). That the state should be the
benefactor of privileges when membership is not defined by nationality requires deeper
examination. For example, arrangements between Thailand, Burma, Cambodia and Laos
to register migrant workers, or arrangements between India, Nepal and Bhutan to permit
access to higher education and the ability to open bank accounts permit cross-national
125benefits and rights that are tied to regional location, not national ones. Yet it is national
governments, examining residence, that proffer the benefits of these regional programs.
While the artifice of national membership remains salient, there is a physical, place-
based importance to these rights and benefits given by the state. Physical removal reflects
a call to explore ‘the spatial linkages between the “hurt and the hurter”’ (Waite 2009,
130427). It is physical residents who walk or drive on the roads, or otherwise use a place’s
infrastructure. It is physical residents who require health services; whether they are
permitted to use such services legally is another question, but this does not stop residents
of all levels of membership from needing such services by having children, getting sick,
and dying. It is physical residents who engage in ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin 2009, 368), for
135example, lobbying politicians directly or participating in demonstrations that require
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physical presence to produce ‘an interruption and transformation of the political’ (Nyers
2011, 141).1 And it is physical residents whose lives prop up the lives of other residents:
through legal work, undocumented work, child care, elderly care, and simple, daily
interactions. In short, the physical residence of persons represents a key aspect of how
140our world is shaped and coloured, as does, of course, the physical removal of persons. As
Baubӧck has noted, a rethinking of public philosophies of citizenship lets us imagine that
those who live in a place, and thus have a stake in the future of that place, are represented
in the polity (2008). Thus, the permission to remain in one’s physical place is perhaps
paradoxically at the core of a concept of national assignment of privileges and benefits.
145‘Precarity of place’ describes the absence of such permission and can be defined as
vulnerability to removal or deportation from one’s physical location.
Several caveats are necessary. First, in this article, removal and deportation is con-
sidered out of a national space, with national boundaries, but it is clear that the definition
could be used to apply to other types of precarity of place. Here, to enrich our under-
150standing of the term, we will focus solely on vulnerability to deportation from a country,
by a national sovereign government. Second, this definition clearly suggests a continuum,
on which citizenship sits on one end. On the other end is the noncitizen who lacks
appropriate documentation and connections to safely remain. ‘Appropriate’ documenta-
tion is an important modifier, because, as noted by Goldring et al. (2009), the mere
155possession of documents is not sufficient to mitigate a precarious existence. Third, this
definition, which speaks merely of physical location, may appear to be less than capa-
cious, but that is precisely the point: as the subsequent empirical section will reveal, the
simple fact of vulnerability to deportation and removal has wide-reaching implications,
such as a fear of accessing public transportation, social spaces, and public offices.
160Why precarity?
Thus precarity of place – vulnerability to removal from a country – deserves our attention.
But why, if the concept of the precariat originated to describe precarious work, is it useful
in this context? In other words, why not use a different term, such as insecurity, that does
not focus primarily on labour? In sum, the two types of precarity share five compelling
165elements. These elements are (1) similar root causes; (2) the tightrope-like nature of both;
(3) similarly ambiguous social and economic class identification; (4) varied methods of
collective action; and (5) the importance of social networks to both. In this section, the
two types of precarity are named as ‘labour precarity’ and ‘precarity of place’ in order to
differentiate them.
170First, the roots of both labour precarity and precarity of place are external, and, at their
source, stem from the colonial legacy and neoliberal economic forces. Fantone suggests
the link between colonialism and our current use of labour in exploitative and precarious
ways (2007, 10). That is, colonialism’s exploitation of people and resources created
enduring imbalances in the global system whose consequence is consistent efforts by
175former colonial powers to maintain supremacy by reducing labour costs and devaluing
labour rights, leading to a rejection of secure jobs and careers in many sectors. Likewise,
neoliberalism’s emphasis on capital and capital’s need for low-cost workers produces
precarious working conditions.
The hefty literature on the link between neoliberal economies, globalisation, and
180precarity will not be reviewed here; a fine summary by Arnold and Bongiovi notes:
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Global scale transitions and transformations shape the increasing precariousness of work....
The growing power and reach of global capital has exceeded the ability of nations and labor
movements to regulate it, exacerbating inequality and precarious work. Numerous labor
trends have been associated with neoliberal globalization, including a decline in attachment
185to employers, an increase in long-term unemployment, growth in perceived and real job
insecurity, increasing nonstandard and contingent work, risk shifting from employers to
employees, a lack of workplace safety, and an increase in work-based stress and harassment.
The lack of public and private investment in skills and development is accompanied by a lack
of access to schooling, where women and ethnic and racial minorities disproportionally bear
190the brunt of these disadvantages. (2013, 290)
Precarity of place is related to these same forces. The imbalances that both colonialism
and neoliberalism have wrought, and the extreme movement of capital as part of the
neoliberal agenda, have fuelled seasonal and temporary work, facilitating an ‘economic
logic’ migrant labour (Sassen 2001, 34). As Standing has noted, ‘capital welcomes
195migration because it brings low-cost malleable labour’ (2011, 103). In fact Standing
devotes considerable attention to explaining how undocumented migrants both fuel the
neoliberal engine and are its primary victims. ‘Too many (socioeconomic) interests benefit
from an army of illegal migrants, and too many populists depict attempts at legalisation as
eroding the security of the citizenry’ (2011, 91). Put another way, the unequal flow of
200labour and capital across borders creates not only migrant populations, but the deprivation
that underpins many of the world’s current conflicts. As such, migrants of all kinds can be
similarly made precarious by globalisation (Castles 2010). And it is widely known that
colonialism lies at the root of many of the conflicts that have produced today’s flows of
forced migrants, most of whom lack appropriate documentation when they cross borders
205(Chimni 1998).
The second similarity refers to the tightrope-like nature of precarity, the anxiety of
‘teetering on the edge’ (Standing 2011, 20). Thus precarity is the condition of ‘not quite,
not yet’. That is, not quite poverty-stricken, not yet impoverished.2 Similarly, precarity of
place describes the condition of not quite homeless, not yet deported or detained. For
210many populations living in refugee camps, for example, a thatched roof above their heads
suggests a physical shelter, but at the same time, the threat of deportation looms if
authorities find something awry. With very limited recourse for legal protection, refugees
such as these teeter on the edge: not quite forced to flee once again, not yet safe from
scrutiny by host authorities. This teetering quality has both practical implications (e.g.,
215difficult to plan the future) and psychological ones, and affects the kinds of choices that
people make in everyday life. A broad swath of literature has asserted the profound
psychological effects of uncertain understandings about our futures, in particular, the
deeply damaging effects of indefinite detention (Silove and Steel 1998; Steel et al.
2006; Silove et al. 2007).
220The third similarity that the two concepts of precarity share is the difficulty to identify
its members with traditional understandings of class and status. Uncertain labour may fall
mainly to low-skill and low-wage workers (Branch and Hanley 2011, 597), but it is also
associated with other categories of insecure workers of varying skill-levels, such as skilled
‘permatemps’ in the food industry (Elcioglu 2010, 123) and artists (Bain and McLean
2252013). This is why Standing has referred to the precariat as a ‘class in the making’ (2011,
7). Labour precarity describes those who are not necessarily part of the ‘working class’ or
the ‘proletariat’ but instead includes both skilled workers struggling to find secure
employment, on the one hand, and lower-skilled and inexperienced workers, on the
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other hand. Similarly, migrants experiencing ‘precarity of place’ cross borders with a
230variety of skill sets, education, and experience. Reinforcing this, it has been noted that
migration
is formed by heterogeneous rather than unitary social networks, possessing distinct personal
and social resources, having differential human and social capital, migrating under disparate
circumstances, and expressing significant local, regional, political, cultural and religious
235differences. ... [Migrants thus often have] dissimilar political and economic opportunities
and constraints. (Smith 1997AQ3 , 243)
The two types of migrants that Abrahamson identifies – unskilled (who mostly find jobs
in the service industry in global cities) and skilled (often those who have chosen exile
from a restrictive country) (2004, 49) – offer a useful starting frame for dividing
240precarious populations, although this division requires further differentiation, because in
both migrant and refugee populations, one finds skilled and unskilled populations. For the
purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that precarity of place makes victims of all
groups.
One of the implications of this heterogeneity of victims, as it were, is that collective
245action among mobilisers for both populations (those experiencing labour precarity and
precarity of place) will take on forms informed by the motivations and needs of each, a
point that has been made in the transnational social movement literature (Tarrow 2005;
Brees 2010; Banki 2013). Labour precarity activists, as noted, have developed significant
‘repertoires of contention’ to make rights claims about wages, work safety, and employ-
250ment stability (De Sario 2007). These can be colourful, playful affairs, laden with
symbolism, such as the Chainworkers, an Italian activist group, who created San
Precario, patron saint of the precariat, and took his effigy on tour throughout the country
(Vanni and Tari 2005). Or it may be sombre demands for change. At the University of
Sydney, sessional teachers working on short-term contracts set up a temporary, open-air
255office in the quadrangle to demonstrate the temporary, unresourced nature of
their employment (http://www.nteu.org.au/blog/University-of-Sydney-39/tag/Mark%20in).
AQ14 Because migrants who leave countries with economic and political problems are often
forced into situations of precarity, engaging in activism in the host country – to better
one’s rights where one lives, or to the place where one might return – has considerable
260appeal. But in the case of precarity of place, mobilisation is very much tied up with the
political opportunity structures available in the host country (Tilly 1978; Burgerman
2001; Tarrow 2005).
Finally, there is an increasing recognition that social networks can serve to mitigate
both labour precarity and precarity of place. Arnold, citing the Institute of Sustainable
265Development for the South of Vietnam (2009), argues that ‘commune networks’ of
rural-urban migrants from the same area of the countryside facilitate trusting environ-
ments, allow people to share skills, experience, and material goods. Further, Legal Aid
Centres in Vietnam have recognised the importance of such networks and are now
seeking to deliver legal information through these networks (Arnold 2013, 481). Bain
270and McLean point to artists’ collective social spaces in Canada to respond to margin-
alisation and insecurity (2013). Similarly, one of migrants’ greatest protection against
removal and detention is the knowledge and assistance of informal community net-
works (Banki 2006).
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Empirical examination
275In this section, the situation of migrants from Burma living in Thailand is examined
through the lens of precarity of place. This population was chosen deliberately as an
attempt to expand the precarity literature to non-citizen populations of the Global South.
As will be clear, those vulnerable to deportation and removal from Thailand cannot easily
be slotted into the ‘undocumented’ category. Indeed, they possess a range of statuses and
280types of documentation, which, while not the subject of this article, has been widely
explored in both academic (Smith 1997; O'Kane 2007) and policy literature (Caouette and
Pack 2002; Human Rights Watch 2004). Whether registered, in possession of refugee
identification, or with no documentation whatsoever, migrants from Burma offer a clear
example of how labour precarity and precarity of place are uneasily aligned.
285Burma, also known as Myanmar, was a military dictatorship for four and a half
decades, referred to as a ‘pariah’ nation by human rights organisations (Human Rights
Watch 1999). In 2011, however, the country began a period of political and economic
reform. A semi-civilian government, packed with former military serving as ministers,
replaced military rule (Human Rights Watch 2012; International Crisis Group (ICG),
2902012AQ4 ). While the next general elections scheduled for 2015 present the possibility of a
significant shift to a majority of seats held by the National League for Democracy (NLD),
observers contend that obstacles for adequate representation of the range of interests and
parties will remain (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2012). There are heated debates
about the genuineness of the reform (Altsean 2012; Lintner 2012; Selth 2012), but
295scholars concur that the changes are more than cosmetic (International Crisis Group
(ICG), 2012). While some internal changes are evident, those who left the country due
to decades of political and economic instability have not returned to Burma. For these
migrants, return to Burma is not yet on the horizon; structural faults of a political,
economic, and social nature take a long time to repair even in the most optimistic of
300scenarios.
Today, there are an estimated 2 million undocumented migrants in Thailand from
Burma (UNHCR 2013). This includes 83,033 refugees (TBC 2012, 8) – recognised by the
Royal Thai Government (RTG) as ‘displaced persons fleeing fighting’ (Laungaramsri
2003). While the classic differentiation between migrants and refugees is meant to suggest
305that the refugees were forced to flee and the remainder moved willingly, in reality, data on
the two populations have rarely reflected reality. In Thailand, for example, the figure
mentioned above should not suggest that the 83,000 are the only ones in danger nor that
the latter are simply seeking economic opportunity; they merely represent the ways in
which the RTG and the international humanitarian community try to make sense of those
310populations experiencing precarity of place.
The refugee and migration literature is replete with discussions about the difficulty of
differentiating between the two populations and the significant grey area in which most
migrants fall (e.g., Castles 2004). This discussion will not be repeated here, except to say
that Burmese migrants in Thailand very much follow the path of mixed migration, that is,
315the heterogeneity of migrant populations makes it impossible to tag an entire group with
one set of experiences (e.g., Caouette and Pack 2002). Further, migrants come with mixed
motivations that emerge at different temporal and spatial locations. It is thus difficult to
identify one group with respect to the other. In this section, both populations are referred
to as migrants, except where a differentiation in labelling is necessary.
320Just as colonisation and globalisation play a role in creating the conditions that
produce precarious work in Thailand (not the subject of this article, but see Arnold
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(2005) for an excellent summary), so too do they produce precarity of place. Numerous
analyses of Burma’s dual struggles for independence and autonomy point to its colonial
history and a poor transitional period as the source of the country’s myriad ethnic rifts,
325emphasis on military power, and inability to heed the results of its 1990 election
(Silverstein 1998; Lang 2002; Fink 2009). These occurrences have led to outflows of
Burmese migrants and refugees for decades, first documented by border groups who noted
ethnic minority populations fleeing across the border into Thailand as early as 1984
(TBBC 2004). Exacerbating these conditions, and leading to further undocumented
330migration across the Thai–Burmese border, are globalising forces in Southeast Asia that
(1) attract Burmese migrants to work in Thai factories that produce for multinational
corporations (Arnold and Bongiovi 2013); and (2) have opened the door for extractive
industries to engage in exploitative labour in Burma, thus increasing outflows by those
migrants fleeing human rights violations. For example, the Yadana gas pipeline, a project
335of French Total, US Chevron, Thai PTTEP, together with the Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise, has been extensively documented as contributing to widespread human rights
violations, including forced labour, and subsequent migration from the country
(Earthrights International 2009).
Migrants from Burma in Thailand come from a wide spectrum of social and economic
340class continua, just as, globally, the labour precariat do. Those with education and skills
are the smaller group, and primarily comprised (1) refugees from urban areas of Burma
with political leanings, who have worked as activists to effect change in Burma over the
past 20 years; and (2) rural ethnic minorities from Burma who have been trained as
medics or midwives or pharmaceutical assistants in camps or on the Thai–Burmese border
345by international aid organisations.3 The former group, with excellent English and polished
writing skills, and the recipients of myriad human rights/capacity building trainings
(MacLean 2004; Egreteau 2012), are by and large dependent on overseas advocacy
organisations to pay their salaries. As has been argued elsewhere, the ‘logic of the activist’
suggests that those with skills sometimes choose to remain gainfully and meaningfully
350employed, even if it means they face precarity of place (Banki, forthcoming 2013). Thus
relatively well-paid job opportunities that mitigate labour precarity still present fearful
challenges to living, residing, and communicating, placing the dangers of precarity of
place in stark relief.
The presence of unskilled migrants in Thailand working in fishing and seafood
355processing, garment factories, construction, and as domestic workers is well documented,
including both the legal challenges they face and the civil society organisations that have
emerged to protect them (Arnold 2005; Pearson et al. 2006). Thailand’s immigration
policies for migrant workers has been equally well covered in the policy literature; since
1992 the RTG has formed and reformed policies (ad hoc at the start) to manage the inflow
360of unskilled workers (Chantavanich et al. 2007). Since then, registration programs to
formalise the work of migrants, and subsequent criticisms of these programs, have come
one after another. The earliest efforts to register migrants were called ‘no more than a
yearly relaxation of the immigration law’ (Chantavanich et al. 2007, 5). The 2003
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the RTG signed with Burma (as well as
365Laos and Cambodia) to attempt to legalise workers began the process of ensuring both
rights and obligations of legal workers, but implementation has been slow because of high
registration fees and the presence of corrupt officials and employers (Human Rights
Watch 2010, 72–78). Extensions of the deadlines have done little to quell the concern
of potential registrants, who continue to fear threats of deportation (Schearf 2013). Most
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370relevant to this article, it has been noted that this registration process, even for those who
completed it, did not assure protection against arrest:
A registered worker’s status always remained illegal, pending deportation due to original
irregular (i.e. illegal) entry, despite the legal permission to work, and restrictions on freedom
of movement were extensively applied and extensive social protection denied to these work-
375ers. The cumbersome nature of registration processes has always ensured both workers and
employers rely on unregulated brokers to formally register and this significantly results in
debt bondage. (Hall 2012, 6) (italics in the original)
Thus registration that workers hoped would resolve their labour precarity appears to be of
little use in addressing the issue of precarity of place. The example clearly delineates the
380difference between labour precarity and precarity of place, and the importance of differ-
entiating between the two. It also supports the contention that there are no ‘bright
boundaries’ between legality and illegality (Goldring et al. 2009, 256).
The precarity of place experienced by migrants from Burma has a tightrope-like
quality, in that migrants are still in residence, but living fearfully, and changing their
385quotidian behaviour. A July 2013 raid in Chiang Mai, Thailand, for example, instilled fear
in migrants from Burma’s Shan state in such a way that they stopped going to work and
avoided going out publicly. One ethnic Shan migrant noted that ‘There is fear among
migrants as police check every day on all the streets’ (Nyein 2013). The inability to be
mobile – to move from one place to another – is exactly what characterises those who
390experience precarity of place. Because a modicum of safety is only plausible with no
movement outside the place of shelter, it is argued here that the element of mobility ought
to be vested with great significance. Thus, as an implicit corrective to our earlier definition
of precarity, we must also acknowledge that precarity of place occurs when one becomes
vulnerable to deportation simply because one moves from one place to another, or is
395physically in a public space. Mobility, then, is deeply linked with precarity’s ‘teetering on
the edge’ quality.
Related to mobility is the ability to mobilise. For Burmese migrants in Thailand,
precarity of place and its associated discontent provide the motivation for collective
action, but these are likely to vary based on what is permitted by the RTG. Following a
400crackdown on public events like demonstrations in Thailand in 2000, the coordinator of
Altsean-Burma, a civil society organisation seeking to effect change in Burma, noted that
activists sought out other means to promote awareness about human rights violations in
Burma (such as low-key events, and the production of publications in English, Burmese
and ethnic languages) (AFP 2000). More recently, a migrant activist who writes about
405continuing problems in Burma from inside Thailand noted that while the RTG knows of
his organisation’s existence, his office could be ‘raided at any time’. In order to remain in
Thailand, he noted, he changes the location of his office frequently.4 For this migrant and
others who similarly engage in underground activism, precarity of place and precarity of
labour intersect, because activism provides employment. Thus, the balancing act of
410locating safe spaces to live while also operationalising a human rights campaign is a
response to both kinds of precarity.
Finally, given that the threat of deportation to Burma is real, and that mobility is
restricted for those experiencing precarity of place, it comes as no surprise that networks
are critical for Burmese migrants. That migrant networks are an integral response to
415precarity is intuitive as well as documented, and are often transnational in nature. Support
in the form of shelter, food, and other economic resources, as well as the sharing of
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information on employment or government restrictions, is commonplace among Burmese
migrants, as research on Karen refugees demonstrates (Brees 2010; Lee 2012). And
scholars have noted that women migrants from Burma, for example, work through social
420networks to respond to trauma in transformative ways and use transnational advocacy to
challenge notions of sovereignty in Southeast Asian nation states (O'Kane 2007). For
migrants from Burma who have no documentation, networks allow the unmobile to sit
tight when crackdowns arise. Networks cannot mitigate precarity entirely, but they can
stop deportation in the short term. As one migrant noted, ‘When the police are active, the
425others from Burma are the only thing that stand (sic) between me and the police. I can’t
leave my house, so they do it for me.’5
This section has grounded with empirical examples the theoretical assertion that
labour precarity and ‘precarity of place’ are related, but separate phenomena. An exam-
ination of migrants from Burma in Thailand demonstrates that there is significant overlap
430between the two types of precarity, that they stem from similar sources (colonialism and
neoliberalism), and that they produce similar kinds of differentiated victims, of varying
skills levels. While both types of precarity have activist components, those experiencing
‘precarity of place’ also find themselves limited by host government restrictions that shape
the modes and strategies of activist campaigns. And while networks are important for both
435types of precarity, and share some similar traits (e.g., sharing of information), in the
former instance it is used to fight the structures that have imposed precarity, while in the
latter, a more direct mitigation of precarity of place is attempted by networks.
This empirical examination has also laid bare the ways in which mobility and
precarity are related. For the labour precariat, mobility becomes a tool by which employ-
440ment can be obtained, a ‘mode of subjectification’ (Lorey 2010, 3) by which movement is
required in order to remain on a teetering tightrope. For Burmese migrants experiencing
precarity of place, however, mobility is a luxury that is dependent on the policies and
practices of host governments or local officials. This confirms research on the ethnic
Karen from Burma in Thailand, where mobility has the potential to unlock refugees from
445‘spatial incarceration’ (Lee 2012, 266). While the relationship between precarity and
mobility is intuitive, it is not well theorised. But the examples above make clear that
mobility is so crucial to mitigating precarity that it ought to be accorded the same status as
political economists give to development. Rather than Sen’s suggestion that we consider
development as freedom (1999), we might well consider mobility as freedom.
450Conclusion
This theoretical and empirical examination of precarity has offered spatial and political
counter concept to current understandings of precarity. The term ‘precarity of place’
focuses on the challenges of being migrants and the tightrope quality of noncitizen life.
The article draws several parallels between the growing literature on ‘labour precarity’
455and the term offered here, ‘precarity of place’, including its origins in colonialism and
neoliberalism, its nebulous class quality, and social movement responses. While the article
focuses on those displaced across national borders, the term may also be theoretically
useful for other populations experiencing precarity of place: internal migrants, those
displaced by climate change, or those dispossessed of their land. These populations, as
460well as others, are similarly vulnerable to removal and hence deserve consideration.
There are theoretical and practical implications of a clearly defined understanding of
precarity of place. First, the term draws together the related literatures of precarity, forced
migration, membership and denizenship, and, at this initial stage, notes not only the
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human rights implications, but the basic quality of life issues associated with permission
465to reside. In theoretical terms, this is a valuable nexus that holds rich possibilities for
exploration. Second, precarity of place acknowledges that the state’s ability to remove
individuals from their territory, while an important component of sovereignty, has the
potential to develop a ‘class’ of individuals, whose needs and goals could directly
challenge that very sovereign power. Third, the term suggests the importance of mobility
470as a necessary element of residence.
Further research is of course needed to explore the concept. Two suggestions are
offered as a way forward: first, efforts to bring together the conceptual understandings of
precarity – the existential, the labour-related, and precarity of place – would be most
welcome in providing future theoretical avenues to grasp the difficulties of instability,
475uncertainly, and insecurity.
Second, further empirical research on migrants and refugees could better delve into
questions of removal, refoulement (forced return) and detention – those who are subject to
it, what responses have been, and these effects. There are of course studies that have
begun this examination, but it is not systematic, and there is limited focus on the Global
480South. A cross-country or longitudinal study of precarity of place, establishing links
between threats of removal and other quality of life issues, would be welcome and highly
valuable.
Notes
1. In the political arena, physical absence can be manipulated by those who physically remain.
485Burman notes that in Montreal the names of arrested and deported activists continue to
reverberate and circulate, and be ‘memorized by opponents of secret trials and arbitrary state
detention powers’ (2006, 280).
2. I thank Sharni Chan for the term ‘not quite, not yet’.
3. The number of Burmese skilled migrants has decreased rapidly in Thailand in the past few
490years, for two reasons: first, the process of resettlement, whereby a small group of countries of
the Global North have agreed to move and offer citizenship to large portions of the camp
refugee population, have drained the camps of their best educated and skilled residents (Banki
and Lang, 2008). Second, recent changes in Burma have encouraged some, but not all, of the
activists on the border to return to Burma to engage in Burmese civil society directly, from the
495inside (Naing, 2012).
4. Interview with ethnic Sgaw Karen male refugee activist, May 2013, via Skype.
5. Interview with female Burmese migrant, January 2013, Thailand.
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